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One of the essential characteristics of cloud computing which revolutionized the IT 
business is sharing of computing resources. Despite all the benefits, security is a major 
concern in cloud virtualization environment. Among those security issues is securely 
managing the Virtual Machine (VM) images that contain operating systems, configured 
platforms, and data. Confidentiality, availability and integrity of such images pose major 
concerns as it determines the overall security of the virtual machines. This paper 
identified and discussed the attributes that define the degree of security in VM images. 
It will address this problem by explaining the different methods and frameworks 
developed in the past to address implementing secure VM images.  Finally, this paper 
analyses the security issues and attributes and proposes a framework that will include 
an approach that helps to develop secure VM images. This work aims to enhance the 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
Introduction 
 Cloud computing adaptation by IT business and industries over the recent years 
has increased tremendously. Cloud computing is a model which provides rapid 
elasticity, on-demand self-service and with virtualization, it allows to share computing 
resources among different Virtual Machines(Hogan, Liu, Sokol, & Tong, 2011). Despite 
the huge advantages of cloud in reduced cost, efficiency and scalability, there is several 
security concerns that impede the adaptation of cloud environment. John Chambers, 
CEO of Cisco at the RSA conference in San Francisco referred to cloud computing and 
stated that “It is a security nightmare and it can't be handled in traditional ways (Duffy, 
2009). More to traditional security issues like Denial-of-service, specific cloud security 
issues like multitenancy problems, authentication and access control level issues and 
virtualization level issues like VM migration and VM isolation always provide loopholes 
to compromise the integrity and security of the cloud.  
 This paper discusses VM images and identifies their exploits and then presents 
the essential characteristics a secure VM image should have. VM images are the 
specific templates that are stored in cloud repositories which are used to create the 
Virtual Machines(Gabor, 2016). Integrity and security of the Virtual Machine Images 
(VMIs) should be ensured as it defines the overall security of the cloud environment. 
Different approaches and frameworks have been developed over time to secure the VM 
images in the cloud, but they lack in certain aspects which trying to improve others. 





removal, tracking modification and scanning of malware but it has several drawbacks 
(Wei, Zhang, Ammons, Bala, & Ning, 2009). It introduces huge performance overhead 
and scanning of the image does not guarantee that the image is malware free. Similarly, 
EVDIC approach proposed by Kazim, Masood and Shibli, can maintain privacy, integrity 
and access control but it lacks unwanted data removal and software updates.   
Problem Statement 
 Many Businesses and Organizations are reluctant to adapt to cloud environment 
and migrate their VM to the cloud. This is mainly attributed to the lack of security.  One 
of the major security issues is VM images protection and deterrence which is slowing 
down the adaptation of cloud. 
 The efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the cloud are solely based on the 
sharing of the VMI or retrieving the images from the repositories that are created by 
cloud providers or third parties. For instance, publishers of VM images may 
unintentionally release some privileged information like username and password files 
while making the image public. Moreover, when the retriever runs such images it is 
possible to develop and propagate Trojan horses lowering the overall security of the 
virtual machines in the cloud (Wei et al., 2009). Similarly, security patching of the 
dormant images from the latest security vulnerabilities is complicated and if the dormant 
images with some vulnerabilities are operated they may easily infect other images in the 
compute cloud.  
 A survey carried three years ago, over AMIs revealed that 98% of the Windows 





vulnerabilities. Out of those 5303 images audited 612 contained at least one shell 
history file which contained around 160, 000 lines of command history, and identified 74 
identification credentials (Marinescu, 2013). 
Nature and Significance of the Problem 
 With the growth of cloud computing, eventually, all the data and applications of 
the consumers are being centralized into the cloud. The cloud image publisher can 
upload images in the cloud repository. Publisher’s images sometimes, unknowingly or 
with malicious intent may disregard security holes in such images. The service 
providers or administrators hosting such images face issues of compliance and SLA 
agreement with the user. On the other hand, users downloading such public machine 
images or community implemented images open the back door to host malicious 
content and may also allow a hacker to access their system.  
Objective of Study 
 The objective of the study is to investigate and identify the security exploits in VM 
images and suggest possible security controls for Virtual mobile infrastructure (VMI). 
First, existing VM security efforts including important frameworks and approach will be 
analyzed to see the security controls covered. Afterwards, the study will provide a 
framework of security attributes to improve the security of the VMI. 
Research Goals and Questions 
 Following research questions were put forward before starting the research to 
help complete the research: 





a. What are the current efforts in creating Secure VM Images (i.e. 
Techniques/ methods)? 
b. What are the attributes that can define a secure VM image? 
2. Propose steps and procedures to develop a secure VM providing the users in the 
form of recommendations. 
Definition of Terms 
Cloud computing: Internet-based computing that provides the required resources and 
services on demand. 
On-demand-self-service: Feature of cloud computing that allows scalable cloud 
computing capabilities without interacting with the service providers. 
Virtual Machine Image (VMI): A template that contains Operating System, data 
structures and applications required to initiate a Virtual Machine. 
Amazon Web Services (AWS): Includes several services Amazon has provided in the 
cloud for computing, storage, networking, database and applications. 
Amazon Machine Image (AMI): Amazon web service-based template that contains 
information to launch an instance.  
VM migration:  Moving virtual machines from one physical environment to another.  
Cloud Service Provider (CSP): Companies that provide cloud services to organizations 
and individuals. 
Community Implemented Images:  Public Images made available for the specific 





Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS): The cloud service providers provide the networking, 
storage and servers but the customers manage all the layers above including the 
Operating System. 
Platform as a Service (PaaS): This service provides all the infrastructures needed for 
developers and architects where they can start developing and deploying applications. 
Software as a Service(SaaS): It provides all the services even the software applications 
are providing. It is targeted directly to end users. 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO): Organization responsible for 
various international standards. 
Patching host: Host which can mount and access an offline image like their own file 
system which is used to perform the file replacement actions required while patching on 
a running VM(Zhou et al., 2010).  
Simple emulation-based patching: This approach of patching a running VM by file 
replacement actions from a patching host(Zhou et al., 2010). 
Emulated environment: Environment set up by the patching host to perform patching 
(Zhou et al., 2010). 
Identity and Access Management(IAM): It is a service that allows an organization to 
manage users and groups, and uses permission to allow or deny access to the 
resources. (“Identity and Access Management (IAM) - Amazon Web Services (AWS),” 
n.d.) 





Role Based Access Control(RBAC): It is a method of a restricting system or network 
access based on the role of an individual within the organization. 
Distributed Denial-of-Service Attack(DDOS): This is a cyber-attack in which multiple 
systems overload the resources of a system to make it unavailable to its users. 
Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3): It is the storage service provided by 
Amazon cloud that offers scalability, availability, security and performance.  
Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2): It is the web service provided by 
Amazon that provides computing capacity where the users can launch virtual servers. 
Application Program Interface(API): API is a set of routines, tools and protocols that are 
used for building software that specifies how the software interacts with the users. 
Hypervisor: It is a software or hardware that allows running of virtual machines. The 
machine which allows running of VM on top of it is called host machines and the VM are 
called guest machines. 
Hyper Text Transfer Protocol(HTTP): It is an application protocol that allows the 
transmission of data from the web. 
File Transfer Protocol (File Transfer Protocol): It is a Network protocol that is used to 
transfer files between a client and a server.  
Secure Socket Shell(SSH): It is a cryptographic network protocol that is used to access 
the unsecured network in a secure way.  
Nmap: It is a security scanner that traces packets to find hosts and services on a 





Domain Name System(DNS): It is the naming system for the computer or services over 
a network. Domain names are the alphanumeric representation of IP addresses. 
Domain Name System translates between an IP address and domain names.  
Summary 
 This chapter provided a glimpse of cloud computing components mainly the 
virtual machine images and benefits of the cloud. With the increased use of resources 
and services, there come security and integrity challenges and this section narrows it to 
VM images security. The next chapter discusses in detail about the VMI and different 


















Chapter II: Background and Review of Literature 
Introduction 
 This chapter explains in depth about the virtual machine images and will identify 
the attributes to have a secure VM image. Moreover, approaches to maintain secure 
VMI are discussed in detail and their methodology involved to deal with the threats and 
vulnerabilities.  The chapter also analyzes the issues related to VM migration, sharing 
and isolation since they attribute to make the VM images vulnerable. 
Background Related to the Problem 
 Virtualization is the key concept of the cloud as it has helped to improve the 
performance speed and lower down the cost of cloud computing but along with it comes 
several virtualization level issues. As stated by Hussein in his paper “Eliminating the 
virtualization layer will avoid the security hazards but this will exclude the vital features 
like VM mobility”. The components of virtualization are hypervisors, virtual machines 
and virtual machine images. 
 Whole concept of cloud computing is achieved through virtualization. It allows us 
to utilize the shared pool of resources to create the Virtual Machines to carry out 
different tasks simultaneously.  A server without virtualization allows only one system to 
run at a time in the server which is very inefficient in terms of cost and infrastructure. 
But with virtualization, we can run many instances of Virtual machines on a single 
server.  A simulated environment is created which is called the virtual machines and the 
instances of virtual machines are called virtual machine images.  Based on the 





software, memory and storage. Most commonly used virtualization is hardware 
virtualization which is divided into full, para and emulated virtualization.  Virtual 
machines in full virtualization are unknown of the underlying hardware which is different 
from paravirtualization.  
 In full virtualization, different operating systems called the guest operating 
systems are run on top of the host (hypervisor) which is a connection point between the 
VMs and the underlying physical hardware.  Some hypervisor runs on the top of another 
Operating system and is called the host operating system (Scarfone, Souppaya, & 
Hoffman, 2011). Full virtualization provides the necessary hardware’s interfaces and 
hence no modification must be done for the operating systems and its applications.  In 
paravirtualization, the  hypervisor provides the necessary interfaces for the guest OS 
instead of the normal hardware interfaces to be compatible with the underlying 
(Scarfone et al., 2011). 
 Virtualization architectures can be bare metal and host OS based. In bare metal 
hypervisors run without the host operating system. Tools availability will be reduced 
using such architectures, but it will reduce the potential surface attacks since there is no 
host OS reducing the amount of code being executed on the system. Host OS provides 
many utilities for controlling the virtualization Services like file-sharing, web browsers 
and email clients can be utilized by the VMs (Brenton, 2011). 
 Another form of virtualization is desktop virtualization which provides support for 
an application running in that specific OS and allows changes to be made in OS. 





2011). For the organization to have security over the virtualization technologies, NIST 
provides the following recommendations:  
Component Security: Every component of the virtualization solutions should be properly 
secured following standard security practices, updating the software’s and applying 
appropriate techniques to detect and prevent attacks (Scarfone et al., 2011). 
Administration privileges: Utilize different techniques to manage hypervisors and limit 
the administrator access the virtualization system. 
Hypervisor security: it is the underlying architecture of the whole virtualization solution. 
Disable the unused virtual hardware, disable services like file-sharing when not needed, 
monitor the security of each guest OS maintaining the availability of the hardware and 
the services to the guest OS. 
Careful planning: Careful Planning of security before installing and deployment will help 
organizations to avoid expensive and difficult security hurdles. 
Of all these components, security of the VMs is fundamental as it determines the 
security of the layers above (PaaS and SaaS).  Adopting a secure VM image is a way to 
avoid the malicious images but other security issues such as sharing of the VM images, 
VM image backup and rollback and VM isolation should be considered as well. The two 
scenarios of providing security are securing the host environment and securing the VM 
images itself from such malicious host platforms(Pandey & Srivastava, 2014). Some of 






a. Multi-tenancy: Multi-tenancy which is a beautiful aspect of cloud helps to allocate 
the resources as per tenants. Since different VM instances lie on the same 
server or physical environment it possesses the problem of data leakage and 
data mixing between different instances which is termed as mixed-mode 
deployment VMs with mission-critical workload are placed on the same physical 
server along with less critical VM. The less critical VM implements fewer security 
controls in comparison to critical VMs. Also, if there is no separation of duties 
which allows unauthorized and inadvertent configuration of the VMs (“Best 
Practices for Mitigating Risks in Virtualized Environments,” 2015).  The attacker 
can deploy a VM on the same server and run brute-force attack against the 
targeted machine to obtain the system and network information.  
 
Figure 1: Multi-tenancy Security Issue 
 This perceived idea that VM running on the same host are isolated is technically 
right, but they still share a no of resources such as network bandwidth, memory and 
CPU. A compromised shared portion of the resources with other VMs on the network 





b. VM images from repository: Different cloud service providers have their own 
public image repositories where the retriever or consumer can use the image 
created and configured by the third parties. For example, Amazon Web Services 
has their own marketplace where there are thousands of Amazon Machine 
Images and community AMIs in EC2 Service. Those images may have been 
configured and created in such a way that they provide back-door access from 
an attacker (Panday & Srivastava, 2014). The provider faces the problem of 
hosting such malicious images which may spread over other images and 
repositories. Inadvertently publisher may give some critical information like login 
credentials which can easily be recovered and misused by the retriever. 
c. Dormant VM images: Images can be running or inactive. The time when the 
dormant images become active again is enough for a new vulnerability to exist. 
Such inactive images are very difficult to patch against the new vulnerabilities. In 
addition, guidelines on how to activate the dormant VM images are not available. 
These images may also lack up-to-date access control policies and they may not 
be monitored for security as they are inactive which will provide loopholes for the 
security breach (Cloud Security Alliance, 2015).   
d. Sharing of VM images: Users can create, upload and download the images in the 
cloud which means sharing of images is common among different users.  The 
user with a motive to intrude may upload a malicious image and another who is 





In such case, the cloud administrator will also face issues of compliance and 
integrity of the virtual images (Modi, Patel, Borisaniya, Patel, & Rajarajan, 2013). 
e. VM escaping and VM sprawl: The hypervisor which is the monitor of the virtual 
machine. Sometimes when an intruder runs code in the VM, it may happen that 
the OS running in it may escapes and interacts with the Virtual Machine Monitor 
(VMM) or hypervisor. When this happens all other VMs running on the same 
physical environment can be compromised. This uncontrolled VM is termed as 
VM escaping.  
VM sprawl happens when the dormant images occupy most of the 
resources and the active or live images are left with insufficient resources 
(Hussein, Alenezi, Wills, & Walters, 2016). 
Literature Review of the Problem 
 Virtualization in cloud computing along with its advantages brings several 
security challenges as discussed above. Traditional security solutions against 
eavesdropping, DDoS and illegal invasion alone are not enough to deal with the security 
of the virtualization and its key components. As discussed earlier, the paper is focused 
on securing the virtual machine and its images. Different approaches and methods have 
been proposed to improve the upgrade the security level of the VM.  
 Cloud providers serve the purpose of centralization as well as protection of the 
customers VM images. In cloud supports the efficient sharing of the hardware resources 
but the users have no control over the hardware level.  Normally, a user uploads the 





solution) to cloud provider and run over the shared execution environment.  Even 
though the VM and the workload are isolated, securing guest OS running in the 
hypervisor is not possible without the prior knowledge of the information and 
functionality of the guest OS. This along with other assumptions are made in existing 
cloud virtualization security techniques which raises security concern about the integrity 
and security of the VM and its operation (Christodorescu, sailer, Schales, Sgandurra, & 
Zamboni, 2009). 
 One important assumption made is Information about guest OS, source code and 
malware are known and given as blacklists. But VM can be configured with multiple 
guest OSes such as multi-boot VMs, and new malware can be developed constantly. 
Second, the guest system is clean when monitoring starts, and monitoring is done 
continuously throughout its lifecycle. But the points of failure here are that VM may have 
been compromised beforehand. More to that VM can be created, cloned and snapshots 
can be made and can be migrated.  
 This paper based on the above facts proposes an architecture without having no 
information about the guest OS and the source code. On top of it, they develop a 
technique to find out the type and version of the OS. A rootkit-detection and recovery 
service are also proposed to detect harmful changes in the guest kernel and restore to 
the valid state. 
 The integrity of a system is a very important task. You place the integrity 
monitoring system but how do you check the integrity of the integrity monitoring system 





system starting from power on. As discussed above how can you build VM 
introspection-based monitoring system to monitor the VM from outside. It has several 
challenges. There is a semantic gap between the level of detail observed by the 
monitoring system and the level of detail necessary to decide that the VM is secure. 
Also, VM lifecycle is complex. VM image can be cloned modified and migrated. This 
question the efficiency of the trusted boot process and continuous monitoring. To 
develop a secure-introspection technique following assumption are made:  
1. Allow an attacker to control completely the guest VMs (Christodorescu, 
sailer, Schales, Sgandurra, & Zamboni, 2009). 
2. Information about the software inside VMs is not provided to the cloud 
Service Provider 
3. The hypervisor is trusted and cannot be breached. 
4. VMs under the control of the cloud provider cannot be breached. 
Those secure VMs under the control of the cloud provider are used as a host for the 





Figure 2: Overview of the Integrity Discovery System using Secure Introspection 
(Christodorescu, sailer, Schales, Sgandurra, & Zamboni, 2009) 
Figure 2(b) shows how we identify and verify the integrity of the guest. We first 
read the registers in virtual CPU to find out the location. Using the hash values of in-
memory code blocks and while a list of the known operating system we analyze the 
content obtained and determine the guest OS along with the other associated operating 
system structures such as a list of processes and loaded kernel modules. Using the 
whitelist for the guest OS we analyze all the data structures and check for modifications 
and validity of those modifications. Following the execution of code, we can verify the 
integrity of the VM during the live execution. This technique allows monitoring the VMs 
at any point in its lifecycle because the discovery of the OS structures depends only on 
the hardware state. (Christodorescu, sailer, Schales, Sgandurra, & Zamboni, 2009) 
Using the while list we can monitor for the infection and already infected system. 





from the whitelist. Assuming, hypervisors and the VM cannot be breached, this will allow 
to dynamically determine the integrity of all the components in the VMs. 
Evaluation of the guest-OS identification was done by setting up a test network 
using Honeyd in a Linux VM.  Honeyd was run in the generic windows machine with 
some services like HTTP, FTP, SSH and POP and a Cisco router with Telnet enabled 
as shown in the figure.  Nmap was run on both the VM and OS identification code on 
Secure VM. “Nmap identified the honeyd “personalities” as Windows and as different 
network devices” (Christodorescu, sailer, Schales, Sgandurra, & Zamboni, 2009). And 
the code identified the VM as Linux. 
 
Figure 3: Experimental Setup for guest-OS Identification (Christodorescu, sailer, 
Schales, Sgandurra, & Zamboni, 2009). 
For rootkit detection, a windows system infected with Trojan W32/Haxdoor.AU 
was monitored. The anti-rootkit system in placed showed changes in the six-system 





firewalls and antivirus rely are active and unaltered. It also detects and alerts if a rootkit 
penetrates these routines and fixes it. This research clearly presents the solution for 
where customers that run a variety of guest OS and those which need monitoring. 
Wei et al. proposed an image management system called Mirage that provides 
access control, track the provenance of images, filtering of the images and scanning 
against the malware and repairing them (Wei, Zhang , Ammons, Bala, & Ning, 2009). 
The access control framework controls the unauthorized access of the VM images. This 
way the images shared by the publisher in the repository are protected for the 
unauthorized access. Provision tracking mechanism tracks the origin of the image and 
changes that are made to the images. If any operations and alteration in the images are 
done, the person doing so is held accountable thus reducing the possibility of the 
intentional malicious attempt. Sometimes the publisher may include unwanted 
information such as password file, login credentials and malware in the images. Image 
filtering mechanism will reduce the chance of publishing such unwanted information and 
retriever’s risk of downloading such malicious content while downloading such images. 
The scanning feature will continuously scan to identify the bugs and it will fix such 
vulnerabilities. However, providence tracking mechanism introduced huge overheads in 
space and time (Wei, Zhang , Ammons, Bala, & Ning, 2009). Also, there is no 
guarantee that the scanning method will completely detect and fix the vulnerabilities 
present. 
Hussein et al. proposed a framework gathering and the security controls from 





and Technology (Hussein, Alenezi, Wills, & Walters, 2016). He combined security 
control from the literature and from industry standards to develop a framework for 
secure sharing of VM images in the cloud. This proposed framework only provides the 
concept while to develop a framework with only the security measures that should be 
taken into consideration while sharing the VM images. The limitations of this could not 
be identified as it is neither tested nor implemented. 
As stated by Zhang et al. security threats in virtual images are classified as 
protection of the execution environment and protection of the virtual image itself. That 
concept of running the VM in a protected environment is implemented in the Trusted 
Cloud Computing Platform (TCCP) proposed by Santos et al (Santos, Gummadi, & 
Rodrigues). This includes two types of components. Trusted Virtual Machine Monitor 
(TVMM) which runs on the node and hosts customer’s VMs and provides a closed box 
execution environment to protect against the malicious privileged users. The next 
component is Trusted Coordinator which consists nodes where user VM’s are hosted. It 
has its own Trusted Key (TK) which identifies the VM and ensures that it is running on 
the trusted environment. However, this prototype results in overloading of the nodes 
with every transaction of the Trusted Coordinator and Trusted Key.  
Zhou et al. proposed a patching mechanism called Nuwa, for dormant images 
which was the problem of Mirage approach Nuwa uses simple emulation-based 
patching to patch offline images. Before patching it performs a safety analysis of the 
patch to ensure the script is safe. If the script is unsafe then it rewrites the patching 





feature to perform scalable multiple patching. But, it cannot patch the suspended VM 
image offline, which includes a snapshot of the system memory state along with the file 
system (Wu, Zhang, Wang, & Bala, 2010) . 
Aslam et al. proposed a protocol to launch VM securely using trusted computing 
technology on public cloud platforms (Aslam, Gehrmann, Rasmusson, & Bjorkman, 
2012).  To verify that the CSP provided platform is trustworthy, before launching, the 
image is pre-packed and encrypted by the symmetric key. Researchers also designed 
the framework to implement that protocol to show bonding of VMs on a certain platform 
to fulfil the security requirements. Besides that, flexibility in load management and 
upgrading platforms is limited by that bonding. 
To verify the integrity of the VM instances and the host Schiffman et al. proposed 
a verification service called Cloud Verifier (CV) (Schiffman, Moyer, & Vijayakumar, 
2010). The integrity of the CV is first verified by the cloud consumers and CV sends 
attestation requests to the Compute Hosts (CH), where the VM instances are launched 
via images. Then VM images integrity is checked by the CH and again by CV. After that 
verification, then only the cloud user will decide whether to launch the image.  The 
limitation of this approach is “is the verification service transparent and scalable? “.  
For the security of the Virtual Machine Image against channel attack and 
malicious executing environment, Zhang et al. proposed a protocol using encryption and 
hashing techniques (Panday & Srivastava, 2014). It is based on symmetric key’s 
component distribution with integrity and self-protection approach. First, the agent, 





integrity and authenticity of the host based on resource configuration information and 
then decrypts the image and launch the instance. The main problem with this approach 
is that it is not yet implemented in the cloud framework and its performance is not 
known. 
Literature Review of the Methodology 
In case of Mirage, an image management system discussed above, to address 
the security issues, the security risks of image repositories are identified from Publisher, 
Retriever and the administrator's side and the system is proposed as shown below.  
 
 
Figure 4:  Mirage Image Management System (Wei et al., 2009) 
 Its architecture consists of four major components; access control, filters, 
provenance tracking and maintenance.  Access control provides two permissions: check 
in while downloading and running the image and check out while uploading and storing 





mechanism which first stores the original image when it is first uploaded. Filters are 
designed to be repository specific and user specific. Repository specific ensures the 
security best practices for the image which user-specific filters are applied right before 
publishing the image to avoid publisher’s risk or before the retriever’s downloads them 
to ensure it does not have malicious content. Here to avoid the storage and 
maintenance of similar images it is content-based, so only one content is stored if they 
are same even if they are from different images. It was found that performing virus 
scanning time in the mirage system grows slowly with the number of the image in 
comparison to traditional approaches. 
 
Figure 5: ClamAV (Virus Scanner) Scanning Time (Wei, Zhang , Ammons, Bala, & Ning, 
2009) 
Hussien et al. proposed framework based on security controls specified by CSA, 
ISO, NIST and so on. Such security controls were collected from academic literature as 
well as from industry standards and analyzed to remove the duplicates and proposed a 







Figure 6: Framework Development Process (Hussein, Alenezi, Wills, & Walters, 2016) 
 
Figure 7: Framework for Securing VMI (Hussein, Alenezi, Wills, & Walters, 2016) 
In the Nuwa Approach, simple emulation-based patching is used to patch 
dormant images in an emulated environment.  Patch script analysis is done based on 
three concepts: impact, dependence and command classification(Wu, Zhang, Wang, & 





lines to be executed offline are divided as safe, unsafe and unnecessary. A system is 
again divided into memory part if it online or running or a file system part is it is available 
offline depending on the availability. Those commands to be executed impacts the file 
system if they depend on the file system and will impact the volatile components like 
running processes, network and devices if they depend on the memory. While rewriting 
the unsafe scripts, they follow five steps: 
1) Script Specialization:  This ensures that the command lines should align 
with the arguments and the state of image filesystem. 
2) Dead assignment elimination: It removes unused variables from the script. 
3) Removal of unnecessary command elimination and command 
replacement. This technique ensures that the patching host values should match 
to that of the script. 
4) Unnecessary Control-structure Elimination technique removes unused 
joint commands like if and else statements and case statements. 
5) Final safety analysis proves that the Rewritten script is safe to be patched. 
 





           When moving to huge cloud environments with millions of images like Amazon 
EC2 then scalable batch patching seems to be very effective. Nuwa approach used 
Mirage Image Management System concept of storing only one of the similar files, so 
that batching saves time.   
           As seen in figure 7, in phase 1 the Mirage image extracts the patch files and 
imports into the Mirage. In phase 2 Virtual Mount mounts the VM images and executes 
the pre-installation scripts and then file replacement though Mirage Content takes place 
followed by the post-installation of the scripts and final check of the modified images. If 
rewriting cannot produce the safe script, then Nuwa resorts to online patching (Wu, 
Zhang, Wang, & Bala, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 9: Batch Patching of Image via Mirage (Wu, Zhang, Wang, & Bala, 2010) 
           Security protocol as proposed by Anjali et al. maintains image integrity using 
encryption to prevent side-channel attacks and hashing techniques to prevent false 
resource configuration. This protocol uses cryptographic techniques to generate two key 
components: K1 generated by random key generator by dispatcher and K2 is created 
using hash operation on the resource configuration file. The architecture of the protocol 





further processed by the dispatcher as shown in figure Those instances are hosted on 
computer servers. 
  
Figure 10: Architecture of the Protocol ( (Panday & Srivastava, 2014) 
 This protocol has the following phases:  
 Scheduling Phase: User sends the request to launch the instance to the cloud 
management console. The necessary image is selected along with the required 
resource information to the scheduler. The resource information is hashed, and all the 
information is sent to the dispatcher.  
 Dispatching Phase: Using that information from the scheduler the dispatcher 
creates an encapsulated agent which is sent to the server. The encapsulated agent 
created on the user side consists of the encrypted virtual machine image, encrypted 
required resource information, encrypted key K1 given by CA (Controller Agent) when it 
reacts with the hypervisor, hash of image and controller agent CA and its signature 





 Hypervisor Interaction Phase: The agent created is now executed on the server 
side. The hypervisor verifies the controller agent, decrypts Key K1 and generates Key 
K2 by hashing and send to controller agent. The controller agent then combines both 
keys to generate K=K1 XOR K2. 
 Launching Instance Phase:  The key is used to decrypt the image by CA and the 
decrypted image is used to launch an instance.  
 The hypervisor sends the information about the resource used by the image to 
the other servers and scheduler to update the resource availability table. This way, 
publishing of the false resource configuration by the servers is prevented. Then, using 
encryption and key generation we create agents which will prevent the image from the 
direct interaction of the hypervisor maintaining the confidentiality of the image. 
 This paper proposed by Jamkhedkar et.al presents security on demand in cloud 
computing. The consumer requirement for security and performance of Virtual Machine 
varies. This framework provides a range of security options based on the threat model, 
that any cloud consumer can choose from. This framework also proposes the way 
servers are used to provide the desired security protections with a different model. To 
provide the service accurate mapping of security options and enforcement capabilities 
of the server should is required. It also provides lifetime virtual machine security by 
using VM live migration. When the security of the virtual machine is disturbed then it is 
moved into a new server. For testing the average time and downtime for such VM 






Figure 11: Security on Demand Framework (Jamkhedkar et al., 2013). 
 On-Demand Security (ODS) architecture above assumes that the cloud provider 
has different types of servers for different threat model. The VM is deployed on servers 
with the security options as demanded by the customer. Then VM enters security life-
cycle in which the following steps occur: 
- Trust monitor collects the security properties of each server. 
- Trust monitor translates those security properties into security capabilities. 
- The property validation module validates customer request of security policies 
against these capabilities. 
- Then the response mechanism is triggered when the security requirements are 
changed or VM is not trustworthy. The response mechanism normally involves 
migrating VM to another server with enough security features.  
 This framework provides seven different security requirement types as listed 
below for the customer to choose from. Some of the security requirement types are:  
- Basic Security: VM is protected from another VM. 





- HW Protection: Protection against HW attacks and so on. 
 A customer can combine from the different sets of security features to develop a 
Security Request Matrix. That security request matrix is used by the providers to 
allocate the appropriate servers that can fulfil mentioned security requirements. The role 
of Trust monitor is to collect, monitor and maintain the security capabilities of the server. 
Trust monitor resides inside the server. The collected information about the server is 
then passed to the policy validation module which collects the input from trust monitor 
and security policy specification from customer to deploy the VM in the appropriate 
server. There are 2 modes in which the policy validation module runs into. One is the 
above-explained deployment module and the other is the relocation module which is 
activated for VM migration to a new server when the initial server no longer serves the 
purpose. VM migration helps to avoid attacks from malicious VM that were located 
when the VM was previously deployed. 
The implementation of the framework is done on OpenStack Essex platform as 






Figure 12: Implementation of Security on Demand on OpenStack Nova Components 
(Jamkhedkar et al., 2013) 
The Nova modules and data paths were modified to add the features of Security 
on Demand framework. The key performance indicator is whether the VM migration can 
be done within a feasible time. VM was migrated to 7 different servers as shown in the 
table below to test the performance.  
Table 1: Migration Performance with Different Servers. (Jamkhedkar et al., 2013) 
 
The total time is the time between the moment when the migrate command is 





liveliness or, in other words, when VMs are paused. The data column represents the 
amount of data sent during migration. 
 The above results suggest how effective VM live migration is with the use of this 
framework and how it can be used not only to avoid VM-level attacks but also Server-
level and cloud-level (Jamkhedkar et al., 2013). 
Summary 
 The above chapter covers the systemic overview of past researches and 
methodology developed to maintain the security of the VM images. The security of VM 
images does not meanwhile it is running only but it should cover security in its dormant 
state and while it is migrating as well. Moreover, image repositories and hosting 
platform in which we launch the instance should also be trustworthy. The following 
chapter will explain the methodology to develop a framework considering the software 














Chapter III: Methodology 
Introduction                
 This chapter will discuss how the information will be collected to address the 
research questions and how the research will be carried out. No data collection is done 
instead we will analyze the cases and facts in the form of the case study that we 
retrieve from different research paper and journals. No conclusion is made from the 
facts obtained, it will only be used for analysis without breaching the confidentiality of 
the researchers and authors. This includes an in-depth study of incidents which will 
expose those hidden problems to identify the real cause of such incidents. This 
research paper will try to provide the guidelines to address those issues with the 
preventive recommendations. 
 This research paper will specifically discuss the different types of VM images 
based on different characteristics. VM images can be categorized based on activity: 
active and dormant images, virtualization and cloud computing services (Amazon 
Machine Images, Google CE and Azure VM images), based on Operating System: 
Windows and Linux Operating System and those images can be on public, private or 
hybrid cloud and based on the sizes available with different cloud services. The reason 
for choosing VM images with different characteristics and types depend on the need of 
clients. For example, Amazon EC2 has a high temporary storage limit of Up to 48 TB 
compared to Microsoft Azure's 4 TB.  Amazon VM and Microsoft Azure support a wide 
range of database in comparison to Google CE.  VMs in the public cloud is managed 





is responsible for the management and maintenance of the VMs. They are protected 
with the firewall and are more secure than private cloud.                     
 Image types will be reviewed, analyzed in depth and all the related security 
attributes with those images will be discussed in detail.  Attributes like authentication, 
encryption, access control and privileges, malware protection, connection channels and 
so on.                         
Process and Tools             
 A qualitative approach was followed in the process of addressing the research 
questions. This method of study will be used to gather information from different 
industry and academic standards and analyze the obtained resource and information. 
This will help to come up with guidelines and to develop more secure VM images with 
some recommendations. This method to acquire resources from different standards and 
past study is adopted because it clearly considers the fact that those information and 
requirements were collected, implemented, and analyzed. The literature review in this 
research paper is based on different articles, journals, research papers, and different 
trade journals published by industry experts. Source of information also includes the 
resources available from St Cloud State University library website and all those 
published articles and thesis. Two-thirds of the research contains the journal articles 
and research papers and the rest of it includes information from blogs and trusted 
websites.   
 The methodology used to investigate or address the research problem is suitable 





infrastructure it is based on. This specific research methodology is more helpful to study 
the above-mentioned research questions and hypothesis. The analysis of all the 
theories, investigation and publication helped to come up with the possible solutions for 
a secure virtual machine.    I have utilized the research papers that provided me a good 
analysis of the security problems and their approach to addressing those 
problems.           
 The research did not conduct any lab or practical experiments that was outside 
the scope of the starred paper. It always provides room for future research to cover all 
aspects in a broader term and to carry out lab experiment and implement as a thesis.    
Result Analysis 
 Although the use of the image is very effective from the cloud providers and 
subscriber point of view as well but the risk that it brings is quite high. There may be 
specific problems based on the different cloud environment and the types of images, but 
the following are the problems that were common in most of the cloud images. 
Image Security risks 
 As discussed in NIST Special publication 800- 190, an image with vulnerabilities, 
defect configuration, embedded malware, embedded secrets, untrusted software and 
insecure registries, is at risk.  
Image vulnerabilities 
  Images which are not running or are not active are called dormant images. 
These dormant images, as discussed before, lack security updates and software and 





images, there is always a risk that they have developed vulnerabilities which will be 
inherited in the instances and the images created from those instances.  
 CSP or the image may build an image around a software or an application which 
has a vulnerability, which opens the door for the attacker. Such vulnerabilities not just 
inject the malicious files but may attempt to elevate the privileges and may abuse the 
host itself to attack other machines in the host. Software running on windows images 
are more vulnerable than in Linux image.  
 Most of these vulnerabilities are inherited from the third-party images because 
the users do not properly analyze the security aspects while using such images. The 
vulnerabilities can be less vulnerable and may also include critical vulnerabilities like 
remote code execution(Balduzzi, Zaddach, Balzarotti, Kirda, & Loureiro, 2012). If such 
vulnerabilities exist, then the attacker used a network probing mechanism to gain 
identity information about the target instance such as IP address. Then, the attacker 
sets up his machine in the same host if possible and tried to brute force to get into the 
machine. After the successful attempt, the malicious instances are used to run side 
channel attack into the targeted VM. To sum up the above concept, the problem is 
multi-tenancy.  
 Image Configuration 
 Poor configurations in user and privileges always provides the backdoor for the 
images to be compromised even though the image is free from vulnerabilities. For 






 Embedded malware and secrets 
 Images are the files that are used to create VM. These can include malicious files 
intentionally or unintentionally within them. There is a chance of such risk if the image is 
provided by the third parties whose provenance is unknown. (National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, 2017). These images with the malicious files may be used 
to compromise the host environment or other images within the same physical 
environment. It is found that the Windows environment is more prone to malware like 
viruses, spyware and trojans then Linux Operating systems. These malwares can 
perform keylogging in your operating filesystem, stealing the data and files from the 
machine. They are also capable of decrypting the hashes of password files and recover 
the passwords from the browser history (Balduzzi, Zaddach, Balzarotti, Kirda, & Sergio, 
2012). 
Untrusted Images 
 Images possess the high risk of malware, data leakage and other vulnerabilities 
when untrusted and outdated software’s are run in the images. Portability and 
reusability of the images increase the chance that the users may run the images from 
the external sources that is not validated and trustworthy. For example: when 
troubleshooting a problem with the application configuration in the images, there may be 
updated and upgraded applications which do not need for troubleshooting, in the 
images provided by the third party. This compels the user to move for those images and 
which possess several risks. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2017) 





run-time format with hard disk images and configurations that is suitable for a 
hypervisor. Even though it is supported with any cloud platform, but it may not be 100% 
compatible which lefts the room for vulnerabilities. 
Backdoor and leftover credentials 
 Most of the Linux machine images used SSH keys for remote service.  The 
public part of the SSH key is handed to the CSP when a user rents an image. For 
example: when AMI is rented, a user’s public key is stored in authorized keys in the 
home directory by Amazon. “If a user is malicious and if a user does not remove her 
public key before making that image public, then the user can log in into any running 
instances of the AMI” (Balduzzi, Zaddach, Balzarotti, Kirda, & Sergio, 2012). Even if the 
attacker does not have an idea about the live machine he can run brute force attack on 
all the instances created from the images to find out the IP address of the running 
instance to try to use the credentials they got. Gaining access to the IP address they 
can send traffic to flood the instance and carry out Denial of service attack as well.  
 More to that, SSH server provides password-based authentication in addition to 
SSH keys. Likewise, as discussed above, if the password information is not removed 
while pushing the images in the cloud then the image can easily be compromised. More 
to that, password provides a large attack vector than SSH authentication because for 
SSH authentication only the user with the private key, normally the developer or creator 
of the image, can access the image. The password authentication mechanism for 





password cracking mechanism to extract the password from the hashes in the images 
to crack them (Balduzzi, Zaddach, Balzarotti, Kirda, & Sergio, 2012) 
Even if the login credentials are left over inadvertently, third parties or the malicious 
user can utilize such weakness to create a big security problem over the whole cloud 
environment. 
 Unsolicited connections  
 The cloud instances are an open connection to other external applications or 
applications within the cloud environment. It is very difficult to find out that the 
connection is legitimate, or the connection is malicious. In a Linux machine, the syslog 
service is used to log different types of events to a syslog server. It can be the logging 
information of the incoming traffic, connected hardware or the login and logout 
information to the machine.  All these log files are stored in the var/log directory. These 
connections if analyzed provides a lot of information about where the connection is 
going. For example, the connection can be for some software updates or it may be a 
connection to an attacker’s server which will be used to gather information about the 
images such as IP address of the machine. That IP address can later be used to carry 
out the attack on the instances via backdoor.  
 Privacy Risks 
 In the public cloud, virtual machine images are shared among the different 
organizations or users. The creator and the publisher who publishes the images may 
include the SSH private keys or forgot removing access keys that are used to start the 





attempts and browser history to de-anonymize the user and the image creator 
(Balduzzi, Zaddach, Balzarotti, Kirda, & Sergio, 2012). The user who is using the VM 
images for running instance may provide inadvertently increase the risk of adding 
vulnerability to the images or provide a backdoor to the attackers. Images of those 
instances, when shared in the cloud, inherit all the vulnerabilities and security loopholes 
along with it (Livraga & Zhu, 2017). 
1. Private keys:  Cloud consumers use SSH keys to identify if the image they 
are using is authentic and to authenticate the API calls sent by the user to the 
VM Management interface of the cloud providers, API keys are used.  By 
default, images use a certain filesystem to store those keys. For example, 
Amazon uses id_rsa for the SSH keys and *.pem as the extension for the 
AWS API keys. These API keys are not password protected. So, once the 
attacker gets hold of the API keys, he/she can launch the instances from the 
image. More to that, although, protection of SSH keys with the passphrase is 
the best practice, but it is not followed more often.  It is common that the 
users use the same keys to access the other images or other virtual 
machines from the same image. If an attacker gets into one image, then there 
are chances that the other images owned by the user can also be 
compromised. Form the log files, the attacker also can use the failed login 
attempts to figure out the passwords or at least try to guess it. (Balduzzi, 





2. Logfiles and shell history:  The log information obtained from authentication of 
different applications are stored in log files. For example: When accessing the 
web application, HTTP GET requests which contain login information and 
passwords are stored in log files.  
Also, many common shell history files are left on the image during their creation.  
Balduzzi et al., found that of 612 Amazon machine images tested they found that 
around 12% have at least one shell history files. Of all those files 74 different 
authentication credentials were found in the command line in those log files. 
These credentials can easily allow the attacker to compromise the components 
and services hosted in the images in the images (Balduzzi, Zaddach, Balzarotti, 
Kirda, & Sergio, 2012). 
Remote credentials like DNS management password will allow the attacker to 
modify and access the Domain Name Server (DNS) and change the DNS 
configuration and redirect all the traffic from the host to his machine (Balduzzi, 
Zaddach, Balzarotti, Kirda, & Sergio, 2012). 
3. Web environment and browsers: Web Browsers and its history is also another 
concern for the images. Browser history files and information can be de-
anonymize to get the information about the user and the image creator. 
(Balduzzi, Zaddach, Balzarotti, Kirda, & Sergio, 2012). Many browsers will 
have add-ons that are not updated, which will lead vulnerabilities to persist. 





platform. This will invite backdoor trojan, keystroke logger or other malware 
while the user uses browsers for accessing the images (Jansen, 2011). 
 
4. Recovery of Deleted files: So, what does it mean when we say delete the files 
from the image before publishing it? Deleting a file does not destroy the whole 
file, rather it will prevent from accessing the file. To completely delete the file, 
the file should be overwritten. Using file shredders, the user can overwrite the 
files, but it should be done many times to destroy completely all the traces of 
the file. Still, not all file shredders will deal with the slack spaces. So, by 
utilizing forensic tools one can recover the traces of original file even after 
wiping or shredding. As discussed in the paper by Balduzzi et al, where the 
paper focuses on the Amazon cloud images are created by a process called 
bundling. A user follows the following procedure of the bundling process to 
create an image 1) create an image from the mounted filesystem, 2) 
compress and encrypt the image and 3) split it into manageable parts so that 
it can be uploaded for storage (Balduzzi, Zaddach, Balzarotti, Kirda, & Sergio, 
2012). It has two levels of bundling: filesystem and block level. Amazon uses 
for methodologies of bundling to create the images and as shown in the table 








Table 2: Different Methods of Bundling in Amazon Cloud (Balduzzi et al., 2012) 
Bundle Method Level Vulnerable 
Ec2-bundle-vol File System No 




From VMWare Block  Yes 
 
So, it suggests that there is a big security concern regarding the recovery of the 
deleted files. It shows that one can easily use commands like extundelete and 
windundelete to recover the contents from the deleted files. 
 Image registries 
 The images, once created, are pushed to the registries for storage. Then 
managing the registries is equally as important as managing the security of the images.  
1. Configuration of Access control in registries: In the cloud, registries use buckets 
to store the images. For example, Google has a cloud storage bucket to store the 
container images and Amazon EC2 Container Registry. 
Improper configuration of the permission and roles in the registries will surely 
provide the backdoor to compromise the images. As for example, an 





2. Access control governance: To ensure only the valid users can access the cloud 
resources, CSP defines access control governing policies that include risk 
management, governance and compliance.  
3. Insufficient authentication and authorization restrictions: Authentication methods 
used to push, or pull is also a concern. It is always essential to use secure and 
short-lived access for the images such as access token. Registries contain 
images that are very sensitive and are used to run proprietary applications and to 
access sensitive data. Insufficient authentication and authorization in the 
registries will lead to intellectual property loss and expose to the technical details 
of an application that will help the attacker to compromise the images. Moreover, 
registries store many the image and if a registry is compromised it will lead to the 
compromise of the other registries and the host environment (Souppaya, Morello, 
& Scarfone, 2017). 
Different authentication techniques such as password authentication, Trusted 
Platform Module(TPM) based authentication and implicit authentication. Weak 
password practice such as regular use of the same password increases security 
risk. Password authentication is susceptible to dictionary attacks since the 
password functions are stored in the server. In TPM, a hardware-based security 
uses crypto-processer to store cryptographic keys. It is susceptible to a cold boot 
attack. An intruder once escapes the disk encryption and reveal master 





Another authentication based on user’s behavior such as location, application 
usage and motion, is implicit authentication. Data that are collected for profiling 
will disclose confidential information (Tan Fong, Ang, M. L Mat, Kiah, & Shu Yun, 
2017). 
4. Insecure network connections to registries:  Images contain sensitive information 
like organization’s proprietary software and secrets. Poor or insecure network 
connections to the registries for the access of the image and its content always 
possess the risk of data loss and unauthorized alteration of the images. Attackers 
can intercept the network to carry out man-in-the-middle attack and steal the 
developer or administrator credentials and may inject malware contents in the 
image (Souppaya et al., 2017). 
5. Dormant Image in registries:  Images that are not used for running the instances 
falls under stale or dormant images. These images cannot or are not updated 
with the latest security patches and have outdated version of software and 
applications. Such images, when pulled out of the repository, increases the 
chances of a vulnerable version of the virtual machine (Souppaya et al., 2017). In 
addition to that, tool and techniques used to secure the normal files should not be 
used in securing the dormant images because it is not just a file, but it contains 








Solutions and Recommendations 
Image vulnerabilities 
 Organizations or users can use image-specific vulnerability tools and process to 
detect the vulnerabilities present in applications and components of the image. Tools 
used should not be specified to a certain design of the image because tools and 
software used for vulnerability checking give a false sense of security if there is a 
certain change in the architecture in images.  Countermeasures for such vulnerabilities 
include:  
1. Detecting the vulnerabilities early in the image development process and 
implementing solutions to prevent such images from being deployed in the 
cloud environment (Souppaya et al., 2017). 
2. Vulnerability monitoring and detecting mechanism should not be limited to the 
base layer where the OS lies but it should cover from base layer to all the 
software and the application that is used in the images.  
3. Organizations who use the image and the Cloud Service Provider hosting the 
images should only allow the image which meets the organization’s 
vulnerability and configuration policies. The CSP and the subscriber can use 
the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) to determine if the image 
is vulnerable or not.  
4. To detect the outdated software and old images that needs patching and 
updates, organizations can use different approaches. The customers when 





outdated software and applications regardless of the machine is running or is 
dormant. This approach is only suitable for the Linux machines. The update 
checker has the centralized database which contains all the information about 
the software packages, their version that is in the images. If any new version 
or new software is installed in the machine, then the information is updated in 
the central repository. The update checker takes information from the different 
databases like package DB, metadata DB and repository Cache and matches 
the software packages to detect if there are any outdated software. Those 
results are passed on to the user and it also gives information about the 
which software should be prioritized.  
Another approach that can be used as discussed before is Nuwa, patching of old 
an offline image. It implies the patch script to the software that are outdated.  It 
enables scalable patching to many images in a batch. To make sure that the 
patch script is also risk-free, Nuwa performs a safety analysis and rewriting of the 
script. 
Image configuration 
 Security recommendations to avoid image configuration defects include:  
1. Following up standards and best practices to configure the images. For 
example, an organization can always adhere to NIST special publications for 
cloud computing.  






3. Use base layers that are stable, updated and those with less attack surface 
areas. For example, Select the base layers from minimalistic technologies like 
Alpine Linux and Windows Nano Server (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, 2017). 
4. The network configuration and the remote administration tools for the images 
and VMs should not be enabled from the machines. This is because they 
possess a greater threat to network-based attacks. Instead, remote access 
and the network configuration should be run through the runtime APIs which 
may be accessed via orchestration tools or by creating remote shell sessions 
on the host on which the instances are running (National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, 2017). 
In addition to the above-mentioned security configurations, there are other 
security measures that can be employed during the configuration, deployment 
and the networking of the security images, especially in marketplace. Limit the 
attack surface by minimizing the footprints with only necessary Server roles, 
features, services and networking ports. It is highly recommended to remove the 
bass/shell history, SSH keys, log files and unnecessary certificates. Do not use 
the LVM (Logical Volume Management).  
The image should include SSH server by default and should not contain any 
custom configuration such as resolv.conf. It is recommended to create a single 






Embedded malware and secrets 
 To minimize the risk through malware and secret keys and certificates following 
security measures can be implemented. 
1. Monitoring process includes all know malware signatures and behavioral 
detections. 
2. Secrets should be outside of images and provided only during runtime. 
Integrate secret management system in the hypervisor to store the secrets. 
These tools provide APIs to the hypervisor to retrieve secrets. For the 
images, they do not have to manage those secrets and if any attack is done, 
no any secrets can be leaked.Provide the encryption on a need to know basis 
to the images and the VMs and always encrypt the image with approved 
cryptographic algorithms (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
2017). 
3. Configurations settings of Images obtained from third parties should be 
carefully analyzed and follow best practices to avoid any risks.  
Untrusted Image  
 To mitigate the risk of using untrusted images or the components in it, the 
following approaches are recommended:  
1. To deal with the security issue coming from the portability and reusability of 
the images from untrusted sources implement a centrally-controlled 






2. Implement cryptographic signatures to identify and validate the images have 
not been tampered.  
3. Run and store the images only from the approved list of developers when it 
comes to third-party images.  
4. Continuously monitor and maintain the repositories for outdated images or 
image that requires updates in their software and configuration. Even if the 
login credentials are left over inadvertently, third parties or the malicious user 
can utilize such weakness to create a big security problem over the whole 
cloud environment. 
 Backdoor and Leftover Credentials 
 Tools to detect all the credential exposed within the image should be 
implemented by the Cloud Service Providers. For example, AM exposed tool can be 
used for scanning AMIs for common credential leakage. This will look for the presence 
of SSH authorized-keys or SSH identity keys that will allow the potential backdoor and 
access to other hosts. Such tools can also be used to detect the private keys and 
certificate files present in the images (Feinstein & Jarmoc, n.d.).  
1. Password Complexity if not enforced in the cloud should be strictly enforced. To 
add more security to that, multifactor authentication will certainly reduce the risk 
of image compromise. 
2. Frequent rotation for SSH keys and certificates should be. A key rotation will 
generate the new cryptographic key and will back up the old key to decrypt the 





3. Organizations should be clear and identify the normal users and the superusers 
while giving access to the images. 
4. Protocols for data portability needs to be enforced. 
Private keys 
 By analyzing the security concerns, the following measures can be utilized to 
remove the security concerns of the image associated with private keys. 
1. Users should always use IAM services and do not use the same APIs 
keys for all the resources to minimize the risk of APIs keys being exposed. 
2. Always look for the SSH configuration. Protection of SSH keys with the 
passphrase is the best practice but it is not followed more often. A 
customer when using the public images should check for the authorized-
keys in every home directory and delete all the public keys present. 
3. Use CSP provided inbound firewalls to restrict the IP range to block login 
via SSH.  
Log and shell history files 
 Following are the countermeasures that can be used to protect the 
virtual machine images from leakage of information through log and history files. 
1. Provide tutorials and educational videos to the customers to help secure 
use of shared public images. 
2. Publisher of the images should always scan the log files and delete them 






 Web browsers and history  
 Users and organization can employ hardening of the browser environments. 
Organization can encrypt network exchanges against keystroke logging (Jansen, 2011). 
Users can have their built-in browsers in their own virtual environment and should be 
used only for the specific service. For example, Banks can implement this strategy to 
access very secure transaction or a bank service. This will help to minimize browser 
attacks and session hijacking.(Dunn, n.d.) 
 Protection against file recovery 
 Files once deleted are not deleted completely from the filesystem instead they 
are made unavailable. So, administrator and users should always look for ways to 
prevent the forensic analysis of the deleted image information. Following 
countermeasures are helpful in preventing deleted files recovery.  
1. In the case of S3-backed or filesystem backed images, API keys are used for 
bundling authorization. Use extended bundling command in such a way that it 
raises an alert if the API keys are included in the bundling. For example, as 
proposed by Bugiel et al., the bundling tool below issues a warning if API keys 
are included in bundling (Bugiel, Nürnberger, Pöppelmann, Sadeghi, & 
Schneider, 2011). 
 





2. EBS-backed images or volume level images can be easily generated from the 
instances and can be made public. They need a different approach then 
filesystem backed images. CSP can provide a certain mechanism to inform the 
users of the potential risk of private data being included in the AMIs and provide 
tools to prevent forensic analysis of the data (Bugiel et al., 2011).  
3. File shredders which the capability not just to delete the files but to overwrite 
those files with some random data. 
Image Registries 
Countermeasures for authentication, authorization and access control 
configuration 
 Following security recommendations are useful in minimizing the security 
concerns related to authentication and access control:  
1. All access to the registries should be authenticated and classified 
according to the roles of the user. Access writes to the image should be 
provided on a need-to-know basis. For example, Developer of the image 
should be only allowed to push an image to a certain repository instead of 
granting them access to all the repositories (Souppaya et al., 2017). 
2. Logging and auditing of the write access to the registries and careful 
analysis of that login information. Integrate the automatic vulnerability 
scanning and compliance assessment before they are being pushed into 
the repository and are being deployed. This will reduce the chance of 





3. Weakness in password authentication can be reduced with randomization 
of the password. Password authentication protocol must be challenge-
response type so that the server will not have the password function to 
avoid dictionary attack on the server. Asymmetric Password-Authenticated 
Key Exchange(APAKE) is the solution where the client only knows the 
password (Tan Fong, Ang et al., 2017). 
 A platform proposed by R. Chow et al. supports the authentication 
decision based on an authentication score calculated on the user’s behavior. 
This authentication method provides a balance between transparent user access 
and trust in the security of the method (Chow et al., 2010). 
Access Control Governance, risk management and compliance  
 User certification should be provided to verify the roles and privileges to 
the resources. Based on those roles, privileges and behavior risk score can be 
calculated which are certified by risk score-based certification. This will 
eventually provide effective governance and administration. Good organization 
policies and implementation would avoid phishing attacks and loss of control 
which in the end would help maintain compliance (Indu, Anand, & Bhaskar, 
2018). 
Countermeasures against insecure network connections 
1. Users or Organization should configure the development tools and 
services to only connect to registries over encrypted channels. Pushing 





through an encrypted channel. Organizations should utilize Hypertext 
Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) to have a secure connection and the 
image at rest should also be encrypted. For example, Amazon utilized 
server-side encryption to secure the images at S3 (“AWS | Amazon Elastic 
Container Registry | Product Details,” n.d.). 
2. Registries should be timely updated and checked for unsafe and outdated 
dormant images that are no longer in use. Such images should be 
removed from the registries.  
3. Always specify the version of the images while naming the images. This 
will help the organization look for the old version and remove them after 
they were replaced with the new ones.  
 Dormant Image in Registries 
Organizations should follow following measures against the use of unsafe and unused 
images:  
1. Organizations should categorize the unsafe and unused images and work on 
downsizing them or remove them from the repository if they are no longer be 
used. This can be done by automating the process based on time triggers and 
labels associated with the image (Souppaya et al., 2017). 
2. Tags provided to the images should be configured in such a way that it will 
provide you with the specific version so that it will be easy to understand which 






Hardening of Virtual Image 
Hardening of the image is a process that will limit or remove the use of 
unnecessary applications in a VM images to reduce the vulnerability that can be 
exploited by an attacker. The hardened images are more secure than the original 
images. Some of the ways to harden the images are as follows: (“ Cloud 
Computing Design Patterns,” n.d.) 
1. Close unused or unnecessary server ports 
2. Disable unnecessary internal root accounts and services 
3. Disable guest access to system directories 
4. Uninstall redundant software 
5. Establish memory quotas  
The cloud provides will implement the above-mentioned ways to harden the 
image and the hardened images is saved in the VM repository. Hardening of 







Figure 14: Hardening of the virtual image. (“Cloud Computing Design Patterns,” 
n.d.)                      
Summary         
 This section described the methodology involved in the research. The next 
chapter highlights the main content of the study and the necessary information. Different 
types of security concerns associated with the cloud images were discussed in relation 
to the different cloud service providers based on the research and information available. 
The chapter after analyzing all the security concerns has provided with the 
recommendations to minimize or to handle such risk while using the cloud images. 









Chapter IV: Analysis of Results 
Introduction 
 Images in the cloud are basically divided into two types. Images that are provided 
and maintained by the cloud service provider, open-source communities and third-party 
vendors are called public images. All the projects and everyone can use such images to 
create the instances. Customers have trust issues in the safety and security of such 
images. 
 Custom Images are available to a specific set of accounts and are kept private.  
A subscriber or a customer can create such images from boot disks or other images 
and updated the changes made in the configuration to run instances  
 Security is one of the biggest challenges in the cloud environment itself which 
implies in case of the cloud images which are used to initiate the Virtual Machine. In this 
section, the paper tries to focus on the concerns and risks present in the images to 
create a virtual machine image. How the attacks happen on the image is out of the 
scope of this paper. The focus of this research paper in the public images which will 
cover the risk and issues of the private images as well. Analysis of the image is 
basically done with the Linux and Windows images.   
Use Cases 
 This paper will use the findings of experiments and security breaches of an 
image as a scenario for the describe the use cases. Use cases will describe in steps, 





instances and suggesting the solutions or the recommendations to solve such kinds of 
problem.  
 The scope of these use cases is to suggest the users of the image understand 
the security concerns present while using it and how those issues can be minimized or 
prevented so that they can launch a trustworthy virtual machine. 
 To carry out tests of the images is out of the scope of this paper because it is 
expensive, massive technological knowledge and time-consuming. Moreover, it is 
unethical to carry out the testing in the cloud since the image that is used for the 
experiments contains very sensitive information. 
Image Privacy Risk 
Intent: A cloud user wants to use a safe and secure VM image. This includes the image 
to be safe from vulnerabilities, threats, malware and dealing with private keys and left-
over credentials. 
Scenario:  Balduzzi et.al, used an automated system to test the Amazon machine 
image. The test was conducted for five months. The system consists of the 3 
components: 
1. Robot: It initiates AMIs and fetches the login credentials. It was configured to look 
for common usernames like Root and Ubuntu in Linux machines.  
2. Remote Scanner: It looks for open ports using Nmap tool. 
3. Local Scanner: It used Nessus tool to run vulnerability scanning tests with 






 Of the total, 5,303 Amazon Machine Image were analyzed. This included Linux 
machine images and windows machine images from different data centers located 
around the world. Following results were obtained from scanning of the Amazon 
Machine Images by Balduzzi et.al (Balduzzi et al., 2012). 
Findings 1: Software vulnerabilities: 98% of the windows and 5% of the Linux AMIs 
have critical software vulnerabilities such as remote code execution. Those 
vulnerabilities have been found to be more than two years old. 
Findings 2:   Utilizing ClamAv tool after analyzing the filesystems with 850,000 malware 
signatures 2 windows AMIs were infected with Trojan spy and Trojan agent. 
Findings 3:  In two AMIs, /var/log directory showed that the syslog daemon was 
configured to send messages to the remote host whictheh was not in control of the user.  
Findings 4: Login credentials and private keys were left over intentionally or forgotten. 
With the result from Nmap scan and matching the SSH keys obtained from the AMIs, 
over 2,100 AMIs were identified. 
Table 3: Left Over Credentials per AMI (21% of the scanned AMIs shows left over 
credentials)  
 East West EU Asia Total 
AMIs (%) 34.8 8.4 9.8 6.3 21.8 
Password 67 10 22 2 101 
SSH keys 794 53 86 32 965 






Findings 5:  Of total AMIs scanned 612 AMIs (around 125 contained at least one shell 
history files. One those files 74 different authentication credentials were found. 
Table 4: Credentials in History Files 
Findings  Total Image (local) Remote  
Amazon 
RDS 
4 0 4 
DNS 1 0 1 
SQL 7 6 1 
MySQL 58 45 13 
Web App 3 2 1 
VNC 1 1 0 
Total  74 54 20 
 
Finding 6: It was found that the data and files were recovered from the deleted files 
which is a concern for public images. It was also found that deleted files were able to be 











Table 5: Recovered Data from Deleted Files 
Type # 
Home files (/home, /root) 33,011 
SSH private keys 232 
Access keys and certificates 293 
Password file(/etc/shadow) 106 
 
 Possible Solutions 
 The problem and the security challenges found in the findings can be analyzed 
from the consumer, administrator and publisher perspective. All the solutions presented 
below are analyzed from the above recommendations provided. They are then 
categorized based on actors involved in creating, hosting and using images. 
 Publisher’s approach:  Publisher may follow the following measures to gain the 
trust in the images they publish:  
Build and deploy practices: The publisher before publishing the image in the repository 
should utilize the best practices while creating the image. Organizations or the third 
parties publishing the image should deploy an effective solution to plan, automate and 
govern the deployment of applications, tools and resources. 
Clean Images: Utilize the user-specific filters to reduce the data leakage and remove 
sensitive information from the image.  
Crypto-Shredding: Utilize shredding, wiping, sfill, scrumb or zerofree to avoid recovery 





Image Configuration: As discussed earlier, configure the images and network to avoid 
security issues and component failures.  
Administrator’s Approach 
 The administrator should hold the control of authentication, authorization and 
logging and control of the images.  
 Software Updates and Patching:  Software vulnerabilities were present there for 
more than two years in the image. The longer the vulnerabilities remain there, more 
significant will be the threat to other machines. For online images, you can use a few 
online patching utilities such as Microsoft Virtual Machine Servicing Tool to patch but for 
offline images, such a traditional model does not work. Injecting the patching in the 
offline images so that they will run when the image is online is another option, but it will 
delay the startup of the machine. So offline patching solution Nuwa is the best fit to 
patch the dormant images and the VM image will be up-to-date when it is initiated. 
Cloud providers should form a security team to reduce the vulnerability of an image to 
spread all over. Identifying and categorizing those vulnerable images and make such 
image private so the attacker will have fewer chances to attack those vulnerabilities. 
 Maintenance of Image: Images which are stored in the repository is the 
responsibility of the administrator. Those images should be scanned for malware to 
reduce the risk of liability for hosting malicious image.  
 Awareness and Support: Administrator should help the publisher to publish the 
image in a secure way and provide information on what to do and do not do. Support 





the publisher who have less technical knowledge in sharing of the VM image in a secure 
manner. 
 Securing Private Keys: Using the same SSH keys for different resources in the 
cloud should be avoided. The cloud provider is responsible for adding the key 
regeneration script in the image for generating the host key. This host key is used for 
authentication of the SSH server. 
 Retriever’s Approach:   
 The biggest risk for the retriever is that he provides the door for the attacker to 
enter his network with the use of malicious image, especially from the third parties. 
Following approach would be helpful in minimizing the security issues while acquiring 
images:  
 Updates and Configuration: Consumer of the cloud should automate the process 
of updating the software’s and the licenses before they become illegal. Setting up the 
insecure configuration and using pirated software’s will expose the vulnerability of the 
images. Before using the image check the remote configuration of the images to the 
attacker’s machine. 
 Filters and scanning: Users should utilize tools like Secure Clean, privacy 
protection to remove information that is injected maliciously in the images to pull out the 
login credentials. Schedule a periodic task to scan dormant images for viruses and 







Secure virtual machine Repository 
Problem:  Publisher who advertently publishes the malicious image in the repository, 
when used by the user will create an infected virtual machine. So not having a clean 
image will provide room to carry outside channel attack on the other VMs on the same 
network. The problem becomes huge when there is not enough security access control 
inviting malicious actions. There should be a balance between the security access 
control implemented otherwise strict security control may bring performance overhead. 
To identify the security holes, auditing and logging of information is very important.  
Intent: The intent of the use case is to prevent the poisoning of the VM image during its 
building phase that may be introduced via the developer of the image. The access 
control strategies should be in place to prevent data leakage. 
Solutions:  As stated by Fernandez et.al, the virtual machine repository contains a 
reference monitor that has the filter to scan the VM image before being publishing and 
retrieving. User authentication is done via authentication to allow access for publishing 
and retrieving of images in the registry.  The security auditor will do logging of all the 
activities of the virtual machine repository. The following figure will clearly state how this 







Figure 15: Working of Virtual Machine Image Repository ( Fernandez, Monage, & 
Hashizume, 2013). 
 Role Based Access Control (RBAC) can be implemented to control the VMI 
repository. The roles can be varies depending on the type of privileges the user needs. 
 Above stated frameworks and solutions have provided effective solutions to the 
problem mentioned above. The framework proposed by Wei et. Al addresses the 
security concern of the VM images with a Mirage Image Management System. The 
approach provides filters and scanners before they are published and retrieved.  The 
vulnerable images upon detection will be tracked and maintained. Update Checker as 





regardless of the machine is running or is dormant.  The NIST Security Reference will 
provide with all the necessary security requirements for the Vmi and its repository. 
Summary 
 To support that those recommendations are useful, the paper has analyzed the 
findings from the research paper and provided solutions from all the concerned users of 
virtual machine images. Later, use cases that were presented to reflect the problem and 




















Chapter V: Results, Conclusions and Recommendations 
Introduction 
 This chapter will discuss in brief about the findings of the paper from the previous 
chapters and tries to draw the conclusion. This will also explain the methodology used 
to obtain the results and how those methodologies help to carry out the research. The 
main concept of the paper lies in the research questions. The chapter will try to explain 
how the above-mentioned research questions are answered in previous chapters. It will 
try to answer if those reasons are valid or not. Will the above reasoning need further 
research and study before it can be practically implemented? What are the limitations of 
this paper before the users can practically use it. It will also explain what improvement 
and additions can be done in the future to make this paper a very good resource for 
those working towards securing the virtual machine images.  
Discussions 
 This paper utilizes qualitative research to gain an understanding of the security 
concerns of the images, the research paper related to it and help to develop ideas that 
will be helpful to overcome such concerns. The research paper methodology utilized 
white papers, technology blogs, manuals, articles and other publications to gain ideas 
and to answer the research questions.  
Every security concerns were specific to the cloud images were described. More focus 
and attention were put onto be more specific and not to deviate to the other types of 
images or the security concerns related to hypervisor or cloud computing. Every type of 





different perspectives. Risk related to the images registries were better explained and 
information was provided on how they differ from the general filesystem. Understanding 
all those security concerns, solutions to them were provided in the form of 
recommendations. To prove the credibility of those recommendations one use case with 
the issues was presented in the form of findings. And for each of those issues, possible 
recommendations were enlisted analyzing the solutions provided above from the 
publisher, retriever and administrator approach.The following section summarized how 
the paper will answer the above-mentioned research question. 
What are the current efforts in creating Secure VM Images (i.e. Techniques/ 
methods)? 
 The research paper first explained security controls from different organizations 
like Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) and National Institute of Standards and 
Technologies. Based on those guidelines provided frameworks and systems were 
developed by the researchers. Those frameworks and systems which is more specific to 
the image security are discussed in detail. The focus of those research paper is on 
preventive measures to reduce risk and issues related to the research paper. 
Importance was given to the systems and frameworks which are verified such as Nuwa 
and Mirage Image Management System. Security of the executing environment was 
also discussed in detail since it also affects the image security, but it was just to provide 







What are the attributes that can define a secure VM image? Identifying the 
Security Concerns of the VMI. 
 The security concerns of the image right from development, build to deployment 
phase are identified. The attributes identified mostly covers the security risk on public 
images since most of the security risk arises when the image is made public. More to 
that, the private image concerns will be covered within the public image security risks.  
Vulnerable and malicious images in the repository are left unintentionally or 
intentionally. When such images are used the VM created lack confidentiality and 
integrity in them. Instances that have a connection to the other applications within the 
cloud environment or external to the cloud environment highlights the network 
insecurity. Another aspect of image security, a poor configuration is also explained in 
this paper. Leftover credentials such as SSH keys, private keys and API keys are other 
weakness explained to provide a valid explanation for the question.  
 Recovery of deleted files is another big security concern that is prevalent over 
images provided by most CSPs.  
Propose steps and procedures to develop a secure VM providing the users in the 
form of recommendations. 
 All the involved actors such as publisher, administrator of the image and retriever 
of the images can follow the above-provided recommendation to develop and build the 
images and launch the machines from safe images. The solutions explained will try to 





recommendations provided it is found out that the publisher of the images is more 
involved in securing the image.   
Image Security Risks: Organizations and users should use specific vulnerability tools 
and process to detect vulnerability early from the development process.  Different 
approaches that are explained above can be used to detect the outdated software and 
application. Update checker is one way to check the centralized database that contains 
all the information. Nuwa is another good option that can be used to patch offline 
images that are dormant. Standards and best practices available should be followed to 
configure their image following up the configuration requirements. To prevent network-
based attacks network and remote access should not be enabled from the machines but 
should be run through APIs.  
Privacy risks: Sharing of the virtual machine will increase the chances of the exploitation 
of history files, login audits and private keys. Creating awareness to the user seems to 
be the perfect way to minimize those risks. It is now clear from the above 
recommendations that users should not use the same API keys for all resources and 
should have firewalls to restrict the exploitation of SSH login. 
Image registries: The above-provided recommendations made clear that the access 
control to the registries where the image is stored should be enforced on a need-to-
know basis. Use of encrypted channels for pushing and pulling of the image is a very 
important factor to keeps the data and information leakage in the network. Categorize 
and downsizing the image is found to be the best way for the dormant images and 






 This research paper’s focus was to clearly analyze the security problems of using 
virtual machine images especially the cloud images. This paper described the security 
concerns and what needs to be done to remove those security concerns in detail. 
Security concerns were mentioned in this paper analyzing all the available research 
paper from a different perspective. Based on those security concerns, it was easy to 
provide recommendations for those issues and risk. The attributes and the 
recommendations were discussed being very specific to the cloud machine images not 
diverting to the cloud environment and other virtual images. The use cases were 
presented in the paper to support that the recommendations will be helpful. It is found 
that the provided recommendations will be able to fix the issues while using the cloud 
images. 
 In conclusion, this research paper’s aim was to prove a collective document that 
would help the consumers to guide towards choosing the right images and the 
procedures to use the images to initiate the machine in a secure manner. By reading 
this paper, a publisher and retriever should understand the hidden issues while 
publishing and retrieving the images. As an administrator of the cloud image repository, 
various security guidelines and procedures to be followed so that administrator will be 
less accountable. 
Future work 
The scope of the paper was limited to the security recommendations is a more discrete 





recommendations and demonstrate is out of the scope of this paper. However, upon 
investing more time and resources more extensive study and implementation of those 
recommendations would be a huge step towards securing the images in the cloud 
environment.  
 Some suggestions for future work that can be done in this area is listed as 
follows:  
- Work with the security team of the cloud providers and look for approval to 
conduct experiments to make sure that that the recommendations help in image 
security.  
- Careful consideration of ethical issues. Is it ethically justifiable to conduct 
experiments on the cloud environment? Especially while scanning to detect the 
malware and secrets does it hamper the integrity and availability of the user 
information.  
- The organization that provides the cloud service should form a security team to 
detect and access the risk. It is because there will be consistency over 
development and enforcement. Development, deployment and testing in different 
environments will create will not give the accurate result. Continuous integration 
and deployment would ensure consistency and automated deployment of 
security policies across creation, development and deployment, storage in 





- Portability of the image is another important factor. But at the same time research 
done to make the security as portable as the image. Tools and techniques can 
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